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Abstract: This paper analyses the interaction between the EU’s cli-
mate change objectives and its state aid regulation in the area of re-
newable energy through the chronology of the adoption of the EU’s 
key policy documents and related legislation. The EU’s state aid rules 
impose certain restrictions on the public fi nancing of renewable ener-
gy, which is crucial for reaching the EU’s climate change objectives 
in due time. The paper identifi es four challenges in this respect. The 
ultimate challenge for the EU is how to reconcile science, the market 
economy and energy politics. Another challenge for the EU was the 
diverging national energy policies before the ‘energy title’ was intro-
duced in the Lisbon Treaty. The third challenge for the Commission is 
how to move the climate change issues up to the top decision-making 
level. The fi nal challenge is the state aid framework that supports cli-
mate change mitigation, whose upcoming changes should address the 
gap between ambition and reality. The paper aims to assess the poli-
cy  consistency of the EU’s climate change legislation in order to deter-
mine whether the EU’s credibility as a ‘green leader’ is just nominal. 
The notion of ‘nominal green leader’ is related to the consistency of the 
EU’s climate change legislation which seems not to have had the ex-
pected effect determined by the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. 
The paper brings the ambitious policies face to face with the data on 
state aid provided for climate and energy targets and compares them 
with the technological expectations in renewable energy deployment. 
The question that arises is whether it is time for the EU to balance the 
understanding of ‘common interest’ more towards climate change mit-
igation at the expense of certain elements of competition policy. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of the European Union in supporting climate change mit-
igation, accepting the commitments of the Kyoto Protocol1 and the Par-
is Agreement,2 has been extremely important for two reasons. Primari-
ly, the EU was, globally, one of the most developed regions in economic 
terms and in terms of industry. Moreover, the EU has also been shaping 
a political association in Europe, able and willing to contribute to the 
global goal.
It has been established that, during the 1990s, ‘[e]lectricity genera-
tion and industry [were] responsible for the highest emissions […]’,3 since 
‘in Europe, almost half of the electricity is produced in thermal power 
plants […]’.4 The importance of the increased use of renewable energy 
has been confi rmed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Special Report 2018 which indicates that electrifi cation will be 
‘leading to a 3.5- to 6-fold increase in electricity demand […] by the end 
of the century relative to today […]’.5 These scientifi c fi ndings pose an in-
creasing challenge for renewable energy electricity generation and main-
taining the security of supply. Therefore, the main focus of this paper 
and the used indicators are related to renewable electricity generation.
Accordingly, the EU’s climate and energy policy primarily focuses 
on energy reform where again electricity supply and generation adequa-
cy are dominant concerns regarding the intermittency characteristics 
of renewable electricity generation. However, the implementation of the 
EU’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement has from 
the very beginning faced four challenges concerning the integration of 
its climate change objectives into its competition policy and state aid 
rules. These challenges are still relevant for an understanding of the 
interaction between the EU’s climate change objectives and state aid reg-
1 United Nations, ‘Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’ <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019.
2 United Nations, ‘Paris Agreement’ <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/fi les/english_par-
is_agreement.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019 (Recital 4).
3 Nele Dhondt, Integration of Environmental Protection into Other EC Policies. Legal Theory 
and Practice (Europa Law Publishing 2003) 383.
4 ibid, 382.
5 Joeri Rogelj and others, ‘IPCC Special Report 2018: Chapter 2. Mitigation Pathways Com-
patible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development’ in Valérie Masson-Delmotte 
and others (eds), Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global 
Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sion Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate 
Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (UNFCCC − IPCC 2018) 
139 <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter2_Low_Res.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2019. 
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ulations related to renewable energy. They deserve to be addressed, since 
the results of the efforts taken to cope with these challenges directly 
impact on the EU’s ability to meet its own commitments.  Although the 
research on the impact of general competition policy on renewable energy 
deployment deserves assessment, the focus of this paper is on state aid 
regulation, in particular state resources needed to meet EU climate and 
energy targets by 2030.
The EU’s state aid rules pose certain restrictions on public fi nanc-
ing of renewable energy, which is crucial for reaching the EU’s climate 
change objectives in due time. A problem emerges where the urgency of 
climate change mitigation identifi ed by the IPCC forces the EU to attempt 
unprecedented technological change in energy generation. The need to 
support the deployment of renewable energy, shut down coal plants, and 
limit the use of hydropower and nuclear energy due to environmental 
and security issues raises concerns over the viability of that process. 
Two primary worries relate to state aid regulations and the security of 
supply of electricity. State aid rules prohibit the use of public resources 
in economic activities where market competition can be distorted and 
trade affected. However, strict scrutiny of state aid for renewable en-
ergy could lead to problems with the future security of supply and the 
inability to meet the expected timeframe for mitigating climate change. 
Therefore, the paper argues that the ultimate challenge for the EU is how 
to reconcile science, the market economy and energy politics described 
as a ‘tension between science and politics’6 where the Commission is a 
‘catalyst’, understanding that ‘without science, its proposals will not be 
sound, yet without politics they will not be implementable’.7
 Another challenge for the EU has been that of diverging national en-
ergy policies before the ‘energy title’ was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. 
This challenge will be addressed through an analysis of the legal base 
that opened the way towards the EU Energy Policy. The third challenge 
for the Commission is how to move the climate change issues to the top 
decision-making level. The paper indicates that the ‘energy packages’ are 
used to bring out climate change issues. Since energy reform towards 
climate change mitigation requires state incentives, the fi nal challenge 
is  a state aid framework that supports climate change mitigation, whose 
upcoming changes should address the gap between ambition and reality.
The chronology of the adoption of the EU’s key policy documents 
and related legislation show that these challenges are addressed by the 
Commission through causality and in a systemic way in accordance with 
6 Jonas Dreger, The European Commission’s Energy and Climate Policy. A Climate for Exper-
tise? (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 1.
7 ibid, 158.
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the available science. However, the effects of this approach remain ques-
tionable in the light of recent data on the efforts of climate change mit-
igation. The European Environment Agency (EEA) has raised concerns 
that ‘achieving the 2020 targets is increasingly uncertain’8 while the In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA) has underlined that ‘Renewable power 
needs to expand signifi cantly to meet the IEA Sustainable Development 
Scenario share of half of generation by 2030’.9 In this respect, it can be 
argued that the chronology of the EU’s climate change policy and legis-
lation confi rms its consistency, but considers EU credibility as a ‘green 
leader’ as ‘nominal’ due to relevant empirical data.  Nevertheless, this 
could change if the EU addresses the issues of residual market failures 
in RES electricity generation and enhances the use of available EU funds 
to match Member State’s state aid provided for that purpose. The ongo-
ing ‘fi tness check’ of state aid legislation in this area could bring positive 
developments if it reconciles competition policy with climate and energy 
policy, taking into consideration the available science and development 
of energy-related technologies.
2 ‘Tension between science and politics’: reconciling science, the 
market economy and energy politics
The fi rst serious attempt to combat climate change at the global level 
was the Kyoto Protocol10 under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. This international agreement committed its Parties by 
setting internationally binding emission reduction targets. The European 
Union and its Member States are Parties to this agreement. The Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 
February 2005 while its fi rst commitment period started in 2008 and 
ended in 2012. During the fi rst commitment period, the Parties, including 
the European Community, committed to reducing GHG emissions to an 
average of 5% against 1990 levels. During the second commitment period, 
the Parties have committed to reducing GHG emissions by at least 18% 
below the 1990s’ levels in the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020.11 The 
role of the European Union in supporting climate change mitigation at 
the time was extremely important for two reasons. Primarily, the EU was, 
globally, one of the most developed regions in economic terms and in terms 
8 European Environment Agency, ‘Final Energy Consumption by Sector and Fuel in Eu-
rope’ (31 January 2020) available at < www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/fi -
nal-energy-consumption-by-sector-10/assessment> accessed 19 February 2020.
9 International Energy Agency, ‘Renewable Power: Tracking Progress 2020’ available at 
<www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/renewables> accessed 19 February 2020.
10 United Nations (n 1).
11 UNFCCC, ‘What Is the Kyoto Protocol?’ <https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol> accessed 1 
July 2019.
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of industry. Moreover, the EU was also forming a political association in 
Europe, able and willing to contribute to the global goal.
Dhondt provides important data about emissions and the European 
share in global pollution in the 1990s, based on the fi gures from the Eu-
ropean Environmental Agency (EEA), the International Environmental 
Agency (IEA), OECD, and European Commission reports:
Reportedly, around 80% of total world-wide anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions fi nd their origin in the combustion of fossil fuels including that 
for transport and industry. Emissions in Europe are approximately 30 
per cent of this total. In 1990 around 95% of SO2 emissions and 97% of 
NOx come from the combustion of fossil fuels in Europe. Electricity gen-
eration and industry are responsible for the highest emissions because 
they use the most energy as well as the highest sulphur-content fuels.12
At the same time ‘in Europe, almost half of the electricity is pro-
duced in thermal power plants using fossil fuels, in particular coal, oil 
and gas’.13 The obligations taken on by the EU have directly prompted a 
number of Community projects on the development of renewable energy 
sources, building on the pre-Kyoto EU initiatives and have triggered the 
issue of subsidising alternative (non-hydro) renewable energy projects, 
such as wind farms and solar fi elds, by the Member States.14
The ultimate challenge that emerged was how to reconcile science, 
the market economy and politics in the EU that are so closely interre-
lated when it comes to state aid needed for the increased use of renew-
able energy. Jonas Dreger15 describes it as ‘tension between science and 
politics’, arguing that in cases involving energy and climate issues the 
Commission often ends up as ‘catalysts between knowledge and politics’, 
understanding that ‘without science, its proposals will not be sound, yet 
without politics they will not be implementable’.16 The positive circum-
stance for initial climate and energy policy development and implemen-
tation was the 10 year period between the adoption and commencement 
of the fi rst commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. Nevertheless, it has 
to be noted that both the European Community and the EU had already 
initiated pioneering, although small-scale, programmes and policy docu-
ments on renewable energy and environment protection in the 1980s and 
the early 1990s.17 However, Dreger notes that ‘by the end of the 1990s 
12 Dhondt (n 3) 383.
13 ibid, 382.
14 ibid, 416-420.
15 Dreger (n 6) 1.
16 ibid, 158.
17 Dhondt (n 3) 410-420.
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the Commission was deeply frustrated by the limited progress that it had 
achieved on energy-policy harmonization’18 due to the diverging national 
energy policies. This was another challenge on account of the institu-
tional and legal background of the Commission’s position, since its com-
petence in the fi eld of energy was limited before the energy chapter was 
introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. The third challenge for the Commission 
was how to move the climate change issues to the top decision-making 
level. Nevertheless, Dreger identifi ed ‘favorable political circumstances 
with a rising interest in climate change’19 at the end of 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st century as an important aspect that provided the 
Commission with ‘increasing ambition’ to put forward more policy and 
legal initiatives related to renewable energy, security of electricity sup-
ply and environmental protection. Since such initiatives were extremely 
expensive, state intervention and incentives towards more clean ener-
gy were necessary. Therefore, the fi nal challenge was how to regulate 
state aid covering all these processes while avoiding the potential threat 
to market competition. The challenges were addressed in interaction, 
where one was used in dealing with the other. This can be seen from the 
chronology of EU policy developments and legislative activities through 
successive energy packages, state aid reforms and climate and energy 
frameworks.  The climate change threat could not be addressed without 
changes in energy policy. Energy policy could not be changed without the 
use of scientifi c fi ndings from the IPCC and technological developments 
in the energy sector. Technological developments related to the use of 
renewable energy sources could not initially become viable without state 
incentives and the unbundling process, liberalisation in trading with 
electricity and eliminating monopolies. Consequently, state incentives 
had to be regulated through state aid frameworks supporting energy and 
climate policy while preventing distortions of competition and trade.
3 The chronological background to the interaction 
A chronological approach to an analysis of the interaction between 
international commitments, EU policy developments and the adoption 
of binding legal documents in the area of the environment, energy and 
state aid provides a general view of the practical impact of climate change 
prevention efforts on EU state aid policy and law.
Since the mid-1990s, the EU has undertaken four major reforms 
in the electricity and energy sector in general to establish its internal 
energy market.20 These reforms resulted in a number of Directives and 
18 Dreger (n 6) 111-112.
19 ibid.
20 Frédéric Gouardères, ‘Internal Energy Market’ (2019) Fact Sheets on the European Union - 
2019 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_2.1.9.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019.
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Regulations collected in three successive ‘energy packages’ and the latest 
‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ Package.21 The First Energy Package 
was adopted in 1996 and the transposition of its electricity part com-
menced in 1997. The same year, the Commission delivered the White Pa-
per − Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy.22 In 2000, the 
Commission developed  the Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy 
for the Security of Energy Supply.23
In 2001, detailed rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
known as the ‘Marrakesh Accords’, were adopted, establishing the fi rst 
commitment period 2008-2012 for combating climate change. In the fi eld 
of energy, the EU adopted  the Renewable Energy Directive in 2001,24 at 
the same time as the Community guidelines on state aid for environmen-
tal protection.25 The Buildings Energy Performance Directive26 followed 
in 2002. In 2003, the Emissions Trading Scheme Directive27 was adopted 
in parallel with the Second Energy Package, whose transposition began 
a year later together with the CHP Directive.28 All these actions and doc-
uments adopted by the EU institutions provided a good foundation before 
21 Commission, Publications Offi ce of the European Union, ‘Clean Energy for All Euro-
peans’ (2019) <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
b4e46873-7528-11e9-9f05-01aa75ed71a1/language-en?WT.mc_id=Searchresult&WT.ria_
c=null&WT.ria_f=3608&WT.ria_ev=search> accessed 20 July 2019.
22 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission, Energy for the Future: Renewable 
Sources of Energy, White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan’ COM(97) 599 
Final, Brussels <http://aei.pitt.edu/1130/1/energy_white_paper_COM_97_599.pdf> ac-
cessed 19 August 2019.
23 Commission, ‘Green Paper Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply’ COM(2000)  769 Final <http://aei.pitt.edu/1184/1/enegy_supply_security_gp_
COM_2000_769.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019.
24 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 
2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the inter-
nal electricity market [2001] OJ L283/33 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0077&from=EN> accessed 19 August 2019.
25 Commission, ‘Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection’ [2001] Of-
fi cial Journal OJ C 037, 03/02/2001 P 0003/3 − 0015 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001Y0203(02)&from=EN> accessed 19 August 2019.
26 Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2002 on the Energy Performance of Buildings [2003] OJ L1/65 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32002L0091&from=EN> accessed 19 August 2019.
27 Commission, ‘Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trad-
ing within the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC’ (Text with EEA 
Relevance) [2003] OJ L275/32 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD-
F/?uri=CELEX:32003L0087&from=EN> accessed 19 August 2019.
28 Commission, ‘Directive 2004/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
February 2004 on the Promotion of Cogeneration Based on a Useful Heat Demand in the 
Internal Energy Market and Amending Directive 92/42/EEC’ [2004] OJ L52/50 <https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0008&from=EN> ac-
cessed 19 August 2019.
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the Kyoto Agreement was enforced in 2005. That same year, the State 
Aid Action Plan29 was adopted as a comprehensive inventory of state aid 
legislation that should correspond to new policies aiming at more market 
integration, growth, and jobs. It was followed by the Commission’s docu-
ment ‘ An Energy Policy for Europe’30 in 2006 and the fi nalisation of the 
transposition of the Second Energy Package. The Council’s Conclusions31 
of March 2007 represented a surprising breaking point. As Dreger writes: 
‘The European Council’s 20-20-20 agreement from spring 2007 closely 
links the climate and energy policy agenda’.32 This approach would be 
followed in the new State Aid Guidelines for Environmental Protection33 
in 2008, the starting year for the fi rst commitment period under Kyoto. 
A year later, the Gas Emissions Commitments34 were adopted, as were 
the Third Energy Package and the Renewable Energy Directive35 (RED 
2009). The fi rst decade of the 21st century ended with the adoption of the 
EU Energy Strategy 2020.36
The fi rst commitment period under Kyoto ended in 2012 and the 
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, introducing the 
29 Commission, ‘State Aid Action Plan - Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for 
State Aid Reform 2005-2009’ (Consultation Document) COM/2005/0107 Final <https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0107&from=EN> 
accessed 1 April 2019.
30 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament, An Energy Policy for Europe’ COM(2007) 1 Final, <www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/com/com_com(2007)0001_/com_
com(2007)0001_en.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019.
31 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ - Brussels European Council 8/9 March 
2007, 7224/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 1 <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/93135.pdf> accessed 11 August 2019.
32 Dreger (n 6) 111.
33 Commission, ‘Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection’ (Text 
with EEA Relevance) [2008] OJ C82/1 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52008XC0401%2803%29> accessed 19 August 2019.
34 European Parliament and the Council, ‘Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce Their 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Commitments up to 2020’ [2009] OJ L140/136 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009D0406> accessed 11 August 2019.
35 European Parliament and the Council, ‘Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Re-
newable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC (Text with EEA Relevance) [2009] OJ L140/16 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0028>.
36 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Energy 2020 A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy COM(2010) 639 
Final <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010D-
C0639&from=EN> accessed 18 July 2019.
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second commitment period 2012-2020. The same year, the Commission 
developed a document ‘Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the Euro-
pean Energy Market’37 and introduced the Green House Gas Emissions 
Trading State Aid Guidance.38 Accordingly, the State Aid Modernisation39 
(SAM) was adopted in 2012, too, as well as the Energy Effi ciency Direc-
tive,40 followed by the Guidance41 on RES Support Schemes a year later. 
Two key state aid documents, the General Block Exemption Regulation 
(GBER 2014)42 and the Energy and Environment Aid Guidelines (EEAG 
2014-2020),43 followed as intended support to RES development and en-
vironment protection while protecting the common market. By 2014, the 
European Council had adopted a Conclusion on the EU Climate and En-
ergy Framework 2020-2030,44 calling for a 40% reduction in emissions 
and a 27% increase in renewable energy use by 2030, and for a 27% in-
crease in energy effi ciency. It was a year before the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement. While signing up to the Paris commitments, the EU had, in 
37 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market COM(2012) 271 Final’ 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0271&-
from=EN> accessed 18 July 2019.
38 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on Certain State Aid 
Measures in the Context of the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme 
Post-2012 (SWD(2012) 130 Final) (SWD(2012) 131 Final (Text with EEA Relevance) 
(2012/C 158/04)’ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX-
%3A52012XC0605%2801%29> accessed 2 June 2019.
39 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM) COM/2012/0209 Final’ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0209&from=EN> accessed 1 April 2019.
40 Commission, ‘Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2012 on Energy Effi ciency, Amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/
EU and Repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC [2012] OJ L315/1’ <https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0027&from=EN> ac-
cessed 22 August 2019.
41 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission Guidance 
for the Design of Renewables Support Schemes Accompanying the Document Communi-
cation from the Commission Delivering the Internal Market in Electricity and Making the 
Most of Public Intervention SWD(2013) 439 Final <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/
ener/fi les/com_2013_public_intervention_swd04_en.pdf> accessed 18 July 2019.
42 Commission, ‘Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 Declaring Cer-
tain Categories of Aid Compatible with the Internal Market in Application of Articles 107 
and 108 of the Treaty Text with EEA Relevance [2014] OJ L187/1 <https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.187.01.0001.01.ENG>.
43 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on State Aid for Envi-
ronmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020’ [2014] OJ C200/1 <https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014XC0628%2801%29>.
44 Council, ‘European Council Conclusions (23 and 24 October 2014) EUCO 169/14, 24 
October 2014’ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24561/145397.pdf>.
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parallel, adopted the Energy Union Package45 in the fi eld of energy, and 
the Enabling Regulation 201546 in the fi eld of state aid.
The Paris Agreement, which entered into force on 4 November 2016, 
builds on the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol with the ‘central aim to 
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keep-
ing a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius’.47 The EU and its Member 
States are Parties to the Paris Agreement among the 55 initial Parties to 
the Convention, accounting in total for at least an estimated 55% of total 
global greenhouse gas emissions.48 At the time of the entry into force of 
the Paris Agreement, the EU’s public support to energy was estimated to 
be over EUR 200 billion annually, representing the second largest state 
aid according to the 2016 SA Scoreboard.49 In 2018, the Clean Energy for 
All Europeans Package50 was introduced, followed by the revision of the 
Climate and Energy Framework 2020-2030 targets and the legislative 
activities on Governance of Energy Union51 in November 2018. The new 
45 Commission, ‘Energy Union Package, Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Commit-
tee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient 
Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’ COM(2015) 80 Final <https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75e-
d71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF> accessed 18 July 2019.
46 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 of 13 July 2015 on the Application of Articles 107 
and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of 
Horizontal State Aid (Text with EEA Relevance) [2015] OJ L248/1 <https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R1588> accessed 20 May 2019.
47 UNFCCC, ‘Paris Agreement: Essential Elements’ (22 October 2018) <https://unfccc.int/
process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/d2hhdC1pcy> accessed 1 July 2019.
48 ibid.
49 Leigh Hancher, ‘Can the Treaty State Aid Regime Come to the Rescue of Climate Change?’ 
(2017) 16 European State Aid Law Quarterly 1, 1.
50 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and 
the European Investment Bank, Clean Energy for All Europeans’ COM(2016) 860 Final 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:fa6ea15b-b7b0-11e6-9e3c-01aa75e-
d71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF> accessed 12 August 2019.
51 European Parliament, ‘Position of the European Parliament Adopted at First Reading on 
13 November 2018 with a View to the Adoption of Regulation (EU) 2018/… of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, 
Amending Directive 94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, Directive 2009/31/EC, Regulation 
(EC) No 663/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, Council Direc-
tive 2009/119/EC, Directive 2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/
EU and Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013’, 
P8_TA-PROV(2018)0443 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-
0443_EN.pdf> accessed 22 August 2019.
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targets to be achieved by 203052 are at least 40% cuts in greenhouse 
gas emissions (from 1990 levels), a share of at least 32% for renewable 
energy, and an improvement of at least 32.5% in energy effi ciency. At 
the same time, the new Renewable Energy Directive (RED 2018)53 was 
adopted but its implementation in national legislations is not envisaged 
until June 2021. In 2018, the IPCC published its Special Report, too. The 
second decade of the 21st century ends with the European Green Deal,54 
representing the roadmap,55 with actions envisaging European Climate 
Law, the European Industrial Strategy, the European Green Deal Invest-
ment Plan and the Just Transition Mechanism.56 In order to complement 
these efforts, the Commission also decided to undertake the state aid 
fi tness check, thus extending the application of GBER 2014 and EEAG 
2014-2020 to 2022.
The chronology of EU policy developments and the adoption of bind-
ing documents in the areas of environment, energy and state aid clearly 
show the interaction of the climate change prevention efforts in the EU’s 
climate policy and, consequently, energy policy and state aid policy and 
law. The periods for the implementation of the EU Climate and Energy 
Framework since 2007 attempt to correspond to the commitment periods 
determined by the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. It is the same sit-
uation with the calculated percentages of necessary gas emission reduc-
tions. It can also be seen that the EU initially reacted to its international 
commitments related to the environmental and climate policy through 
interventions in energy policy. However, it can be argued that the climate 
policy was not the main reason for interventions in energy policy, but 
rather the effort to achieve a common energy market, to reduce monop-
olies, mostly in electricity generation, and to improve competition and 
52 Commission, ‘2030 Climate and Energy Framework’ <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/poli-
cies/strategies/2030_en#tab-0-0> accessed 7 January 2019.
53 Commission, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2018] OJ L328/82 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L2001&from=EN> accessed 1 May 2020.
54 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions. The European Green Deal’ COM(2019) 640 fi nal <https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF> accessed 9 May 2020.
55 Commission, ‘Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. The European Green Deal’ COM(2019) 640 fi nal Annex 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75e-
d71a1.0002.02/DOC_2&format=PDF> accessed 9 May 2020.
56 More at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-
an-green-deal_en accessed 9 May 2020.
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consumer protection. It seems that for the Commission, energy, competi-
tion and technological development policies were the medium used to in-
troduce climate policy at higher levels of decision-making as a ‘win-win’ 
scenario. Such a situation, combined with technological developments in 
renewable energy and the intentions to create a common energy market, 
provided a vibrant policy playing fi eld in the EU. The other side of the 
coin was the public support that the Commission gained for its reforms 
in the energy sector; however, this was not due to the wider public’s un-
derstanding of the need for the proposed energy packages, but because 
of the climate change prevention aspect which was much closer to the 
ordinary EU citizen. In order to satisfy both aims, the Commission had 
to provide fi nancial support and allow the same to the Member States. 
However, this required adaptation of the state aid framework through 
the State Aid Action Plan in 2005 and State Aid Modernisation in 2012. 
These efforts continue through the Common State Aid Action Plan 2018-
202257 aiming at the further reassessment of a number of state aid regu-
lations, directives and guidelines, including GBER 2014 and EEAG 2014-
2020 and the extension of their application by 2022. This activity, known 
as the ‘state aid fi tness check’, corresponds with the timing of the next 
benchmark for assessing the Climate and Energy Framework targets in 
2023.
4 The TFEU ‘energy chapter’: a legal base that opened the way 
towards an EU energy policy 
The Preamble of the TFEU signed by the Member States in the third 
statement affi rms ‘as the essential objective of their efforts the constant 
improvements of the living and working conditions of their peoples’. If 
the IPCC Special Report 2018 fi ndings are taken seriously, then striving 
to achieve this ‘essential objective’ is ultimately related to the results of 
climate change mitigation. Deterioration of the environmental conditions 
as predicted by the IPCC will have a direct negative impact in the next 
20 to 30 years on the living and working conditions of the population in 
Europe. This wording describes ‘the constant improvements of the living 
and working conditions’ as ‘the essential objective of their efforts’, thus 
providing environmental issues with stronger leverage due to the gravity 
of the problem compared to other objectives. This wording relates to the 
wording in the TEU ‘to attain the objectives they have in common’. The 
objectives understood as general guiding ideas of European integration 
and for the functioning of the EU institutions are predetermined in the 
57 Commission, ‘Common State Aid Action Plan 2018-2022 Strengthening Member States’ 
Administrative Capacity for the Management of the ESIF in the Field of State Aid’ Ref 
Ares(2018)2381918 - 04/05/2018’ <https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/how/
improving-investment/state-aid/stateaid_plan2018.pdf> accessed 13 August 2018.
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legal texts of the Treaties. However, some objectives are subject to EU 
policies developed after the Treaties were signed in response to pressing 
circumstances such as the Climate and Energy Policy. After all, the legal 
acts deriving from these policies are part of the acquis. The implemen-
tation of such policies requires a coordinated approach. It also requires 
enormous fi nancial resources to reform the energy sector in the EU to-
wards the net zero emissions goal, thus supporting the global climate 
change mitigation efforts. Member States and the private sector are the 
fi rst to rely on in this process. However, state aid law remains a poten-
tial threat to every renewable energy investment or production support 
scheme of signifi cant scale. Then, if the Member State activities in this 
respect are subject to strict state aid scrutiny, are there any ‘certain 
areas’ where the Union can ‘support, coordinate or supplement’ their 
actions? The Union’s exclusive competences, such as competition rules, 
marine biological resources and common commercial policy, are written 
in Article 3(1) and those under shared competences, such as the internal 
market, environment and energy, are described in Article 4(2). Moreover, 
Article 11 explicitly states that ‘Environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the defi nition and implementation of the Union’s 
policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development’.
Unlike competition rules, environment falls into the shared com-
petences whose objectives are set out in Article 191(1),58 including ‘[…] 
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide envi-
ronmental problems, and in particular  combating climate change’. Fur-
thermore, paragraph (3) requires that: 
In preparing its policy on the environment, the Union shall take 
account of:
−  available scientifi c and technical data;59
−  environmental conditions in the various regions of the Union;
−  the potential benefi ts and costs of action or lack of action;
58 1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives:
− preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
− protecting human health;
− prudent and rational utilization of natural resources;
− promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmen-
tal problems, and in particular combating climate change.
59 The mentioned scientifi c and technical data are the result of scientifi c research and tech-
nical and technological innovations. Articles 179 to 182 defi ne the objectives of strengthen-
ing the Union scientifi c and technological bases, including demonstration programmes, by 
promoting cooperation with and between undertakings, research centres and universities.
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−  the economic and social development of the Union as a whole and 
the balanced development of its regions.
Further on, Article 192 describes the decision-making procedure for 
the implementation of the environmental objectives:
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall 
decide what action is to be taken by the Union in order to achieve the 
objectives referred to in Article 191. 
However, in the case of ‘measures signifi cantly affecting a Member 
State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply’ the Council acts unanimously in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure. Nevertheless, if a measure involves costs 
deemed disproportionate for the public authorities, a Member State can 
ask for temporary derogations, and/or fi nancial support from the Co-
hesion Fund. This opens the way for bargaining before the Council and 
shows how energy supply and the right to choose the energy mix are im-
portant to Member States, which is one of the key reasons for balancing 
between climate change and energy supply issues.
The aims and procedures in regard to energy issues are further 
elaborated in Article 194, or the so-called ‘Energy Title’. The fi rst para-
graph clearly relates ‘the context of the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market’ with ‘the  need to preserve and improve the environ-
ment’. In this respect, it declares that: 
Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
(c) promote energy effi ciency and energy saving and the development 
of new and renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
The measures necessary to achieve these objectives are subject to 
the ordinary legislative procedure but ‘[…] shall not affect a Member 
State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resourc-
es, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply […]’. However, measures primarily of a fi scal nature 
are subject to a special legislative procedure and are made unanimously 
in the Council. In this article, we can fi nd again that the functioning of 
the internal market is subsequent to the ‘need to preserve and improve 
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the environment’ while the Union’s policy on energy calls on the ‘spirit of 
solidarity’ to achieve the aims declared in points a) to d).
5 ‘Energy packages’ as a precondition for energy reform aiming at 
climate change mitigation
Moussis60 has described the EU Community energy policy as having 
two wings. One being the internal energy market and the other security 
of energy supply. Security of energy supply represents the ultimate goal 
of the EU energy policy while the internal energy market is the outcome 
of the EU competition policy. Interaction between these two policies is 
necessary for the achievement of the goals set by the EU treaties as it is 
necessary for two wings to move in harmony in order to allow the bird to 
fl y. In the context of the European Union, as Jakovac writes, ‘this implies 
creating an effi cient and cost-effective electricity sector followed by a ful-
ly opened, competitive and interest-balanced market structure’.61
Since 1996 there have been activities aimed at harmonisation and 
liberalisation of the EU’s internal electricity market to address market 
access and regulation, consumer protection, interconnection and secu-
rity of supply. These activities also included natural gas markets in the 
fi rst three packages, but the focus was on electricity generation which 
was monopolised by EU Member State public companies until the end of 
the 1990s. Raising the importance of competition policy and the needs 
for more energy, and especially electric energy, easily available across 
the borders of the Member States initiated a process of four successive 
energy policy reform packages.
The First Energy Package, adopted in 1996, dealt with electricity, 
and was transposed into the Member States’ legal systems by 1998. The 
Second Energy Package, adopted in 2003, was transposed into national 
law by Member States by 2004. The Third Energy Package of April 2009 
amended the previous package and set the base for a functioning inter-
nal market on electricity. Finally, the fourth package, which dealt only 
with electricity and was inspired by climate change and energy issues, 
was adopted as the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’62 package in 2016 
and was translated into three regulations and one directive in 2018. 
This package ‘aims to implement the Energy Union and covers energy 
effi ciency, renewable energy, the design of the electricity market, securi-
60 Nicholas Moussis, Access to European Union: Law, Economics, Policies (16th edn, Euro-
pean Study Service 2007) 399-409.
61 Pavle Jakovac, ‘Electricity Directives and Evolution of the EU Internal Electricity Market’ 
(2012) 21 Ekonomska misao i praksa [Economic Thought and Practice] 315, 316.
62 Commission, ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ (n 50).
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ty of electricity supply and governance rules for the Energy Union’,63 as 
presented by the European Parliament.
Although continuous interaction is evident between the science in 
energy technology, law and the economy on one hand, and policymaking 
in the EU institutions on the other, there is serious criticism that the 
implementation of the policies and transposed legislation is not always 
harmonised. Moussis, while recognising the importance of state aid law, 
questions the Member States’ attempts to use the ‘security of supply’ and 
‘diversity of energy situation’ as an ‘excuse for the preservation of their 
national monopolies and of their different regulatory frameworks’.64 On 
the other hand, Anatole Boute65 raises concerns about the impact of the 
unbundling provisions on foreign investments in energy and third-party 
access to EU interconnection capacities, but especially challenges the 
withdrawal of support to renewable energy that ‘jeopardized the credibil-
ity of  renewable energy policies and generated high levels of  investment 
uncertainty’.66
The fi rst Electricity Directive (96/92/EC2) as the ‘electricity part’ 
of the First Energy Package required the legal unbundling of previous-
ly vertically integrated monopolistic companies and the creation of new 
market participants, such as transmission and distribution system op-
erators, as non-competitive parts of the public electricity management 
infrastructure to be completed by February 1999.  From the state aid law 
perspective, the new models of state interventions in the energy system 
and the nature of the transmission and distribution system operators 
and their attributability to the state came under focus at the time.
A further update of the initial directives on electricity and gas known 
as the Second Energy Package of 2003 focused on the development of 
market access and was expected to be transposed into national law by 
Member States by 1 July 2004, with some provisions entering into force 
later on, in 2007. Electricity was covered by Directive 2003/54/EC.67 
Again, state aid issues became interesting in relation to the nature of the 
independent regulatory body or independent system operator. Finally, 
EU climate and energy policy, supporting progressive RES power plant 
63 Gouardères (n 20) 2 
64 Moussis (n 60) 399.
65 Anatole Boute, ‘Energy Trade and Investment Law: International Limits to EU Energy 
Law and Policy’ in Martha Roggenkamp and others (eds), Energy Law in Europe: National, 
EU and International Regulation (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 155-157.
66 ibid, 161.
67 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC [2003] OJ L176/37.
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electricity generation, raised state aid issues but ended in landmark case 
law such as PrussenElektra.
The Third Energy Package of 2009, only two years after the enforce-
ment of the most demanding provisions of the previous package, was ad-
opted with the aim of further liberalising and integrating energy markets 
in the EU. The electricity part of the package covered unbundling energy 
suppliers from network operators and strengthening the independence 
of regulators. As a result, three new documents were adopted by the 
Commission and the Parliament.68 The consequence was that a number 
of countries had to change their legislation and schemes of support, in-
cluding aid for electricity generation from RES, which once again raised 
certain state aid concerns.
The Commission Communication ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ 
of November 2016 clearly relates this energy reform package to the es-
tablishment of the Energy Union supported by the Investment Plan for 
Europe. This package of reforms deals only with electricity and aims to 
address new challenges related to demand response, renewable electric-
ity generation and decentralised generation or so-called ‘energy commu-
nities and prosumers’. Its fi nal aim is to make the average carbon inten-
sity of the EU’s economy 43% lower in 2030 than in 2016, with renewable 
electricity representing about half of the EU’s electricity generation mix. 
The Communication recalls the Paris Agreement and relates it with the 
EU energy policy by stating that ‘the implementation of the EU’s ambi-
tious Paris climate change commitments is now the priority and depends 
to a large extent on the successful transition to a clean energy system 
as two thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from energy production 
and use’.69
Moreover, it identifi es three main goals to be achieved: energy effi -
ciency; achieving global leadership in renewable energies; and providing 
a fair deal for consumers. The Annex to the Communication titled ‘Accel-
erating clean energy in buildings’70 deals with energy effi ciency fi rst. In 
68 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/29; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity [2009] OJ L211/15; and Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1.
69 Commission, ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ (n 50) 3.
70 Commission, ‘ANNEX Accelerating Clean Energy in Buildings to the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and So-
cial Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, Clean 
Energy for All Europeans’ COM(2016) 860 Final <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.ht-
ml?uri=cellar:fa6ea15b-b7b0-11e6-9e3c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF> 
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addition, Annex 2 named ‘Action to boost the clean energy transition’71 
provides an analysis of the integration of the ‘package’ into other EU 
policies and initiatives. Political agreement on the package, which is also 
known as the Winter Energy Package, was reached in December 2018; it 
contains three regulations and one directive.72 It remains to be seen to 
what extent the envisaged benefi ts of this package will be in compliance 
with the competition policy and state aid regulations that are about to 
undergo a fi tness check by the end of 2022.
6 Reality check: fi nancial aspect of energy transition versus data 
on climate mitigation achievements 
A crucial element for the implementation of energy and climate poli-
cy in the EU is the fi nancial resources available at EU and Member State 
level. The best way to undertake a reality check on policy implementa-
tion is to put the fi nancial estimates face to face with the latest data on 
climate mitigation achievements. From the very beginning of renewable 
energy development, the Commission has been involved in a continuous 
process of fi nancial assessment of the costs necessary to achieve the 
overall Community objective of RES penetration, but, it has also weight-
ed such costs against the estimated benefi ts related to energy transition 
towards a low carbon economy.
The estimations of the necessary fi nancial resources for the imple-
mentation of the EU energy and climate policy changed from 1997 in 
each of the successive policy documents.  This is not surprising as there 
were continuous updates to climate and energy policies through the new 
ideas and new priorities based on new technological developments relat-
ed to technical requirements and scientifi c fi ndings. The White Paper for 
accessed 12 August 2019.
71 Commission, ‘ANNEX Action to Boost the Clean Energy Transition to the Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment 
Bank, Clean Energy for All Europeans’ COM(2016) 860 Final <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
resource.html?uri=cellar:fa6ea15b-b7b0-11e6-9e3c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_3&for-
mat=PDF> accessed 12 August 2019.
72 Regulations and Directive related to the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ Package pub-
lished in OJ L158 are: Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Di-
rective 2005/89/EC; Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of En-
ergy Regulators; Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, and Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal 
market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (entered into force on 4 July 
2019 to be transposed into national legislation by 31 December 2020)
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a Community Strategy and Action Plan73 of 1997 estimated the invest-
ment costs required to achieve the doubling of the market penetration 
of renewable energies by 2010 at ECU 165 billion for capital investments 
for the period 1997-2010.74 Considering the possible ways to promote the 
development of renewable energy sources, the White Paper relies on com-
petition policy and the principle of state aid balancing where the bene-
fi cial effects of such measures on the environment must outweigh the 
distorting effects on competition.75 This principle established at the very 
beginning can be read in support of contemporary challenges.
The Green Paper ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply’76 of 2000 reconfi rms the estimates made in 1997. The 
Commission expected at the time that RES development could reach 
EUR 165 billion by 2010,77 but also expressed dissatisfaction with the 
limited results of the programmes developing RES with modest fi nancial 
resources78 and called for more Community investments. Seven years 
later, in a 2007 Commission document ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’,79 
a braver view was presented. Based on estimates that the EU electricity 
73 Commission, ‘White Paper Energy for the Future − Strategy and Action Plan’ (n 22) 11.
74 ‘The Commission justifi es this amount with the prediction that the doubling of the share 
of renewables may require an increase of approximately 30% in the total energy sector in-
vestment but it could create an estimated gross fi gure of 500 000 - 900,000 new jobs, save 
annually (in 2010) 3 billion ECU in fuel costs and a total of 21 billion ECU for the period 
1997-2010’. Commission, White Paper (n 22) 11.
75 ‘When authorizing State Aids, the Commission has to take into account the derogations 
laid down in Article 92 of the Treaty. The guiding principle for the Commission in assessing 
aid for renewable energies, contained in the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Envi-
ronmental Protection, is that the benefi cial effects of such measures on the environment 
must outweigh the distorting effects on competition. The Commission will consider appro-
priate modifi cations in favour of renewable energies in support of its policy in this area 
during the revision of the present guidelines taking into consideration the Council’s Reso-
lution on the Green Paper ‘Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy’ which states 
that investment aid for renewables can, in appropriate cases, be authorized even when they 
exceed the general levels of aid laid down in those guidelines’. Commission, White Paper (n 
22) 13-14.
76 Commission, ‘Green Paper Energy Supply 2000’ (n 23).
77 ‘The target of doubling the share of renewables forms part of a strategy of security of sup-
ply and sustainable development. It needs a major effort, however. The investment needed 
to achieve this target has been estimated by the Commission at EUR 165 billion between 
1997 and 2010. A particularly big effort will have to be made in the electricity sector to 
achieve the target set out in the proposal for a directive on electricity produced from renew-
able sources of 24% of green electricity in 2010 as compared with 12% now’. Commission, 
Green Paper (n 23) 48.
78 ‘The annual budgets for 2001 and 2002 are envisaged to be EUR 14.0 and EUR 11.0 
million for SAVE and EUR 17.5 and EUR 17.3 million for ALTENER. These are very modest 
amounts which do not amount to a real Community policy. Experience with SAVE and AL-
TENER has shown that limited results have been obtained with the exception of selective 
measures’. Commission, Green Paper (n 23) 65.
79 Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ (n 30).
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demand was rising by some 1.5% per year, the Commission warned that 
‘investment in generation alone over the next 25 years will be necessary 
in the order of EUR 900 billion’.80 Moreover, analysis of the adequacy of 
electricity generation and gas supply capacity showed the need for EUR 
150 billion of investment in gas-fi red power plants and an additional 
EUR 220 billion in gas infrastructure since electricity generation was 
expected to be heavily dependent on gas with an import dependence of 
90% in 2030.81
Energy 2020, a strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure en-
ergy82 adopted in 2010, increased further the estimation of the fi nancial 
resources needed to achieve the EU energy and climate framework to 
around EUR 1 trillion by 2020.83 Moreover, in the 2012 ‘Renewable En-
ergy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market Communication’, 
the Commission proposed an energy infrastructure package of priori-
ty energy infrastructure corridors, estimating about EUR100 billion for 
new electricity transmission lines alone.84 Two years later, in ‘A Policy 
Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from 2020 to 2030’,85 
the Commission proposed additional fi nancial interventions for invest-
ments in RES developments.86
80 ibid, 4.
81 ibid, 9.
82 Commission, Energy 2020 (n 36).
83 ‘Over the next ten years, energy investments in the order of EUR 1 trillion are needed, 
both to diversify existing resources and replace equipment and to cater for challenging and 
changing energy requirements. Structural changes in energy supply, partly resulting from 
changes in indigenous production, oblige European economies to choose among energy 
products and infrastructures. These choices will be felt over the next 30 years and more. To 
enable these decisions to be taken urgently calls for an ambitious policy framework. Post-
poning these decisions will have immeasurable repercussions on society as regards both 
longer-term costs and security’. Commission, Energy 2020 (n 36) 2.
84 Commission, Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market (n 37) 8.
85 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from 2020 to 2030’ COM(2014)15 
Final/2.
86 ‘Under the 2020 Framework, the Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) has in-
creased R&D investments across the Union from EUR 3.2 to EUR 5.4 billion per year and 
is progressing towards a single, integrated roadmap to guide future investments. For the 
2014-2020 period, the Union is ramping up investment in energy and climate related re-
search and development and under Horizon 2020, the new Union research and innovation 
programme, close to EUR6 billion will be dedicated to energy effi ciency and to secure, clean 
and low carbon technologies and to smart cities and communities. Increased funds will 
also be available for fi nancial instruments, public private partnerships and SME projects’. 
Commission, Climate and Energy Framework 2020-2030 (n 85) 17.
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The Energy Union Package87 of 2015 estimated that EUR 200 billion 
annually would be needed in the next decade for investments in gen-
eration, networks and energy effi ciency. The package was based on the 
prediction that the private sector would bear much of the cost but also 
admits that access to fi nancing would be of key importance for success-
ful energy transition towards a low carbon economy under free market 
competition.88 A year later, the document ‘Clean Energy for All Europe-
ans’89 increased the estimates to EUR 379 billion needed annually over 
the 2020-2030 period in order to reach the EU’s 2030 climate and energy 
targets. This sum was targeted to investments in energy effi ciency, re-
newable energy sources and infrastructure, in combination with EUR 27 
billion per year devoted to public and private research, and development 
and innovation in Energy Union related areas.
The European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, 
competitive and climate neutral economy of 2018 named ‘A Clean Plan-
et for All’90 estimates that around EUR 520-575 billion annually will 
be needed to achieve a net-zero greenhouse gas economy91 representing 
2.8 % of EU GDP compared to 2% of GDP in 2018. Great expectation was 
placed on Juncker’s plan and cohesion policy funds in this respect.92 The 
Commission indicated that ‘The EU is spending about 20% (over EUR 
206 billion) of its overall budget in 2014-2020 to climate change-related 
87 Commission, ‘Energy Union Package’ (n 45).
88 ‘Today, the European Investment Bank, the Connecting Europe Facility and fi nancing 
under the European Structural and Investment Funds already provide the means. More-
over, the proposed European Fund for Strategic Investments will provide additional sup-
port, hence, further facilitating access to fi nance for projects of European signifi cance such 
as in energy networks, renewable energy and energy effi ciency. The Commission will explore 
proposals for energy investment regimes that pool resources to fi nance economically viable 
investments, avoiding market distortion and fragmentation’. Commission, ‘Energy Union 
Package’ (n 45) 8.
89 Commission, ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ (n 50) 4.
90 Commission, ‘A Clean Planet for All’ COM(2018) 773 fi nal.
91 ‘Today around 2% of GDP is invested in our energy system and related infrastructure. 
This would have to increase to 2.8% (or around EUR 520-575 billion annually) in order to 
achieve a net-zero greenhouse gas economy. This means considerable additional invest-
ments compared to the baseline, in the range of EUR 175 to 290 billion a year. This is also 
in line with the IPCC special report that estimated that between 2016 and 2035 investments 
are needed in the energy system representing about 2.5% of world GDP. However, certain 
options such as a rapid transformation towards circular economy and behavioural chang-
es have the potential to reduce the need for additional investment’. Commission, ‘A Clean 
Planet for All’ (n 90) 16.
92 ‘Environment, resource and energy effi ciency are already very prominent sectors of the 
Investment Plan for Europe − the Juncker Plan − a pillar of which has been the European 
Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) and the EU cohesion policy funds through which the 
EU provides ca. EUR 70 billion for the implementation of the Energy Union Strategy’. Com-
mission, ‘A Clean Planet for All’ (n 90) 17.
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action. The Commission proposed to raise this share to 25% for the pe-
riod 2021-2027’.93
The outcome of the all the previous fi nancial appropriations was 
that the ‘Final energy consumption in the 28 EU Member States was 
5.7% lower in 2017 than in 2005, mainly due to reductions in the in-
dustry sector’.94  Moreover, EEA fi ndings warned that in 2017, the EU’s 
fi nal energy consumption rose for the fi rst time in seven years above 
the indicative trajectory. Most importantly, energy consumption in the 
industry sector fell at an annual average rate of 1.3% between 2005 and 
2017, but as a result of a shift towards less energy-intensive industries 
and a more service-oriented European economy. At the same time, en-
ergy consumption in the growing services sector increased annually by 
0.6% on average due to the fact that the energy demand from electrical 
appliance heating and air conditioning was increasing. This is why elec-
tricity consumption in the services sector also increased by 14.5% from 
2005, while over the same period electricity consumption in industry 
decreased by 8.4%, because of the reduced activity in the sector and 
increased energy savings. Where the impact of renewable electricity gen-
eration on the global climate mitigation aim is concerned, the IEA fi nds 
that renewable power needs to expand signifi cantly to meet the 2030 tar-
gets.95 The Renewable  Electricity Capacity Additions, 2007-2021, updat-
ed IEA forecast,96 provide a valuable insight. Data show that China has 
had the biggest growth of renewable electricity capacity additions since 
2013, while, between 2007 and 2012, it had almost the same fi gures as 
the EU. In 2019, China had 1/3 of the world renewable electricity capacity 
additions, or 65.3 GW, and the IEA forecasts an increase of this share 
in the next two years. The biggest growth of the EU renewable electricity 
capacity additions was in 2011 (40.2 GW) and 2012 (37.8 GW); however, 
it decreased afterwards to 33.9 GW in 2019, with this trend due to de-
crease further according to the IEA forecast. Since 2018, the rest of the 
world, excluding China, India, Japan, Brazil and the US, are building 
more renewable electricity capacity additions than the EU. In the IEA 
93 Data taken from the offi cial EC documents available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-18-6545_en.htm> accessed 1 September 2019.
94 According to EEA (n 9).
95 ‘Renewable power needs to expand signifi cantly to meet the IEA Sustainable Develop-
ment Scenario share of half of generation by 2030. In 2018, renewable electricity generation 
rose 7%, with wind and solar PV technologies together accounting for 60% of this increase. 
Although the share of renewables in global electricity generation reached 26% in 2018, 
renewable power as a whole still needs to expand signifi cantly to meet the Sustainable 
Development Scenario share of half of generation by 2030. This requires the rate of annual 
capacity additions to accelerate; however, renewable capacity growth stalled in 2018 for the 
fi rst time since 2001’. IEA (n 9).
96 ibid.
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forecast for 2020 and 2021, the US will have almost the same growth in 
renewable electricity capacity additions as the EU, while India will reach 
50% of that amount. Future developments in renewable energy genera-
tion would have a direct impact on the reduction of GHG emissions.
The Climate Action Tracker confi rms the consistency of the EU cli-
mate change efforts but questions their real impact since the EU is the 
third-largest emitter of CO2 behind China and the US, arguing that ‘such 
a target would just place the bloc in range of a 2 degrees C-compatible 
reduction’,97 while  China, ironically, is on course to meet its low-set Paris 
targets. When talking about consistency, we should remember that all 
EU climate policy documents actually focus primarily on a 2 degrees 
C-compatible reduction. The IEA reports on global CO2 emissions even 
deepen the confusion, stating that, in 2019, the US ‘saw the largest de-
cline in energy-related CO2 emissions’.
98 The EU decreased energy-related 
CO2 emissions by 5%, which is the result of increasing renewables and 
switching from coal to gas,99 while China and Japan benefi ted in this 
respect from new nuclear reactors.
With all these fi gures in mind, an understanding of what being the 
‘green leader’ means could be diffi cult to agree on. The EU is consistent 
in its attempts to meet the Paris Agreement commitments. Until now, the 
EU has succeeded in meeting its own targets, although with numerous 
diffi culties. However, it could be argued that the EU has achieved those 
targets at the expense of its own economy, downscaling industry and 
manufacturing, and growing the services sector while still being heavily 
dependent on gas and oil imports for transport, heating and even elec-
tricity generation from gas plants that have replaced the old coal power 
plants. The EU economy is based on common interest, ultimately repre-
sented by the internal market with undistorted competition. The ques-
tion is whether it is time for the EU to reconsider the understanding of 
‘common interest’ by putting more weight on climate change mitigation 
at the expense of certain elements of competition policy, such as invest-
ment and operating state aid for renewable electricity generation, as well 
as state aid for energy effi ciency. The fi rst two elements are to ensure 
investors’ security in the energy sector where demand for electricity is 
supposed to increase six-fold by the end of the century. The third ele-
97 Kieran Mulvaney ‘Climate Change Report Card: These Countries Are Reaching Targets’. 
National Geographic 19 September 2019 available at: <www.nationalgeographic.com/en-
vironment/2019/09/climate-change-report-card-co2-emissions/> accessed 1 June 2020.
98 International Energy Agency, ‘Global CO2 Emissions in 2019’ available at <www.iea.org/
articles/global-co2-emissions-in-2019> accessed 20 February 2020.
99 ‘Output from the European Union’s coal-fi red power plants dropped by more than 25% 
in 2019, while gas-fi red generation increased by close to 15% to overtake coal for the fi rst 
time’. IEA (n 98).
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ment is due to the fact that an energy-effi cient EU could save up to 30% 
of currently spent energy, thus reducing the burden of rapidly increasing 
renewable electricity generation that current technology can hardly cope 
with. A more supportive state aid framework for RES energy could be of 
key importance for the continuation of the EU climate change mitigation 
efforts.
7 State aid framework supportive to climate change mitigation
Analysis of the current state aid framework and possible future 
changes, which should be supportive to climate change mitigation in 
the next decade, is focused on three documents: fi rst, the General Block 
Exemption Regulation 2014; second, the Renewable Energy Directive 
2018; and third, Environment and Energy Guidelines 2014-2020. A brief 
presentation of their purpose and defi ciencies will be presented in com-
parison with the available empirical data showing their real impact on 
climate change mitigation in the EU.
7.1 General Block Exemption Regulation
This Regulation is directly applicable in all Member States and was 
supposed to be binding in its entirety until 31 December 2020, but its 
application has been extended until the end of 2022. The scope of the 
GBER regulation limits its application to certain categories of aid, al-
though it is considered a ‘cornerstone’ of state aid modernisation. This 
Regulation exempts Member States from the notifi cation obligation, as 
long as all the criteria are fulfi lled. It simplifi es the award of state aid 
and reduces the duration of processes for aid benefi ciaries. GBER also 
introduces ex-post requirements for Member States, such as the require-
ment to evaluate large aid schemes. The Regulation sets the conditions 
for exemption, subject to the fulfi lment of all the general conditions from 
Chapter I and the specifi c conditions from Chapter III GBER. Aid that 
complies with both general and specifi c conditions ‘shall be compatible 
with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107(2) or (3) of the 
Treaty and shall be exempted from the notifi cation requirement of Article 
108(3) of the Treaty’.  It deals, to a large extent, with the environmental 
aid categories, including investment and operating aid for electricity from 
renewable sources, energy infrastructures, and energy effi ciency, as well 
as for heating/cooling and transport based on green energy. In order to 
limit distortions of competition through state aid measures, the Commis-
sion has developed safeguard mechanisms, such as the evaluation and 
monitoring of schemes of over EUR 150 million annually, while all aid be-
low this threshold has to comply with two main principles: transparency 
and the incentive effect subject to different aid limits and aid intensities.
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Since 2014, GBER has served its purpose, but some changes re-
fl ecting new policies and technological developments expected for the 
period 2022-2030 should be considered. However, some concerns have 
been raised over its aims and the leeway left to the Member States for 
granting tax relief. Jerónimo Maillo argues that ‘State aid control on 
environmental tax reliefs requires a balance between different goals and 
values […]’.100
The State Aid Scoreboard for 2018101 shows fi gures representing the 
use of GBER mechanisms for the period 2014-2017. Aid for industrial 
research received EUR 5.176 billion or 5.3% of all aid provided under 
GBER. Similarly, aid for experimental development reached EUR 6.281 
billion or 6.4% of all aid provided under GBER. Data show that these 
activities were in serious need of state aid.102 Investment aid enabling 
undertakings to go beyond Union standards for environmental protec-
tion or to increase the level of environmental protection in the absence 
of Union standards made up 1.1% of total GBER aid during the same 
period or EUR 1.99 billion. At the same time, aid for  early adaptation 
to future Union standards for SMEs was only 0.5% of total GBER aid 
or EUR 508 million. If the fi ght against time concerning climate change 
mitigation is really an EU priority, then early adaptation should require 
an increase of aid intensity and encourage SMEs and Member States to 
invest more in those measures. Environmental aid for energy effi ciency 
measures makes up only 0.9% of GBER aid with only EUR 843 mil-
lion, and, together with EUR 97 million for energy effi ciency projects, it 
reached altogether 1% of all aid provided under GBER. If we are to look 
more specifi cally at aid amounts for RES, we come to surprising data. 
Investment aid for the promotion of energy from RES covers 1.3% of aid 
provided through GBER, or EUR 1.302 billion, where not all of it is for 
electricity installations. Moreover, operating aid for the promotion of en-
ergy from RES under Article 42, which applies to large companies, too, 
under the competitive bidding process, is EUR 6 million, while for small-
scale installations it reaches EUR 12 million but is insuffi cient to be 
represented as a percentage  of aid provided under GBER for the period 
2014-2017. However, aid in the form of reductions in environmental taxes 
under Article 44 represents 32.1% of total GBER aid, with EUR 31.274 
100 Jerónimo Maillo, ‘Balancing Environmental Protection Competitiveness and Competi-
tion: A Critical Assessment of the GBER and the EEAG’  (2017) 16 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 1, 4.
101 Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2018. Results, trends and observations regarding 
EU28 State Aid expenditure reports for 2017, COMP.A3 Brussels, 7 January 2019, 29 
available at <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/state_aid_score-
board_2018.pdf> accessed 15 March 2020.
102 There are no data regarding the share of research and experimental developments relat-
ed to new and innovative RES electricity generation.
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billion provided under GBER by 2018. As a consequence of the current 
GBER application, the smallest amounts are provided for early adapta-
tion to future Union standards and adaptation beyond these standards 
in environmental protection, along with environmental aid for energy 
effi ciency measures and projects altogether reaching 2.6%. Total invest-
ment aid for the promotion of energy from RES and operating aid for the 
promotion of energy from RES hardly reach 1.4% of aid provided under 
GBER. Industrial research and experimental development cover 11.7%, 
while  aid in the form of the reduction of environmental taxes represents 
1/3 of aid provided under GBER for the period 2014-2017, which is 20 
times more than the sum of support provided to investment and oper-
ating aid for RES promotion. Maillo provides cautious justifi cation for 
this practice regarding energy intensive users that face strong non-EU 
competitors since ‘otherwise the Member States would not establish an 
environmental tax or would fi x it at a much lower rate, a scenario which 
may be much worse for environmental protection’.103 He also argues from 
a different perspective that environmental aid ‘can be more benefi cial, 
in practice, to operators who use more environmentally friendly tech-
niques than traditional ones and could thus indirectly increase their 
competitiveness […]’.104 The need for balance between different goals and 
values is clear from the 2018 State Aid Scoreboard data, showing that 
the EU and its Member States should soon decide on their priorities. A 
diffi cult choice to make − investing more in renewable energy generation 
for the purpose of climate change mitigation or saving their own com-
petitiveness. Leigh Hancer also argues that although ‘aid is targeted at 
the promotion of renewable energy […] it is but a fraction of the public 
support for fossil fuels across the EU’.105 At the moment, data show that 
GBER is saving incumbent technologies and intensive user industries 
more than it is contributing to the Climate and Energy Framework. This 
paper argues that if  the Climate and Energy Framework and the Green 
Deal are the leading policy documents, then state aid policy will have to 
follow while changes to state aid law should complement common efforts 
towards climate change mitigation.
7.2 The 2018 Renewable Energy Directive 
The revised Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2001/EU entered 
into force in December 2018, replacing the original of 2009, when it was 
found that some Member States were about to miss their national RES 
103 Maillo (n 100) 6.
104 ibid.
105 Hancer  (n 49) 2.
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energy targets.106 The new directive establishes a binding renewable en-
ergy target of at least a 32% share of renewable energy in gross energy 
consumption107 for 2030 as a part of the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ 
package. Possible revision upwards could occur by 2023 in order to meet 
the EU emissions reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement. 
Moreover, the directive announces the possibility of proclaiming binding 
provisions regarding cooperation between Member States and with third 
countries, which are currently of a voluntary nature. Most of the direc-
tive is expected to be transposed into national law by Member States 
by 30 June 2021. The main strategic difference is that the goal is set at 
the EU level, unlike the original directive, where national targets were 
determined. Therefore, instead of ‘National Renewable Energy Action 
Plans’ required by RED 2009, the Member States are required by RED 
2018 to provide ‘Integrated National Energy and Climate Plans’ (NECPs). 
They are relevant for the assessment of the Union’s renewable energy 
target in a way that the sum of the expected contributions delivered in 
the individual Member States’ NECPs should show the ‘ambition gap’. 
In that case, the Commission can assist the Member States to improve 
their performance or correct the EU legislation for the same purpose. 
According to currently aggregated numbers of Member States’ NECPs, 
the EU-wide share of RES in fi nal energy consumption would fall below 
its expected  target, reaching from 30.4% to 31.9%, most optimistically 
in 2030.108 Since the voluntary options for support to renewable energy 
deployment in RED 2009 resulted in one statistical transfer, one joint 
project between two Member States and in just one joint support scheme 
between a Member State and a third country, RED 2018 has introduced 
additional support measures.
Therefore, the Renewable Energy Directive aims to assist the Mem-
ber States to comply with the Union’s commitment under the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change. For the fi rst time, a target defi ned at 
Union level has been created to provide greater fl exibility for the Member 
States in accordance with their specifi c circumstances regarding capac-
106 Stephanie Essig and others, ‘Policies for CSP Deployment by Renewable Energy Co-
operation in the EU’, Deliverable 6.2, MUSTEC Project, September 2019, 7 available at 
<https://mustec.eu/node/115> accessed 1 June 2020.
107 ‘The gross fi nal energy consumption in each Member State from renewable energy sourc-
es equals the sum of the gross fi nal consumption in transport, heating and cooling sector 
and electricity. For this purpose, gas, electricity and hydrogen shall only be considered once 
and the contribution from wind and hydro power plants are accounted by using a normal-
ization algorithm defi ned in Annex II of RES Directive 2018/2001 considering the produc-
tion and capacity during the past 15 years. Notably, electricity generated by a hydropower 
plant with water that had previously been pumped uphill may not be counted − regardless 
of the electricity generation technology used for up-hill water pumping’. Essig (n 106) 16.
108 ibid, 19.
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ity to produce renewable energy. The directive tries to balance between 
the ambition set out in the Paris Agreement and the current techno-
logical situation, as well as the expected technological developments, 
through cost reductions for investments in renewable energy.  In relation 
to state aid, RED recognises ‘support schemes’ as ‘an effective way’ for 
the deployment of renewable electricity but only if they do not distort the 
electricity markets. This is to be achieved jointly through an enabling 
framework comprising the enhanced use of Union funds and the support 
provided by the Member States.
Consequently, the Commission has committed to ‘[…] support the 
high ambition of the Member States through an enabling framework com-
prising the enhanced use of Union funds, including additional funds to 
facilitate a just transition of carbon intensive regions towards increased 
shares of renewable energy […]’.109 Four priorities are determined under 
fi nancial instruments:
− reducing the cost of capital for renewable energy projects;
− integrating renewable sources into the energy system, ensuring 
its fl exibility and maintaining grid stability;
− developing a transmission and distribution grid infrastructure, 
intelligent networks, storage facilities and interconnections;
− enhancing regional cooperation between Member States and with 
the third countries.
Reducing the cost of capital for renewable energy projects is en-
visaged through the state aid rules, namely GBER and EEAG, using 
investment aid. Integrating renewable sources into the energy system, 
ensuring its fl exibility and maintaining grid stability can be achieved to 
a certain extent by state aid measures through operating aid. Develop-
ing a transmission and distribution grid infrastructure, intelligent net-
works, storage facilities and interconnections is necessary for the future 
integration of RES electricity. Enhancing regional cooperation between 
Member States and with third countries aims for better utilisation of 
existing resources and faster accumulation of fi nancial resources for fu-
ture technologically determined and effi ciency driven renewable energy 
projects. In his initial assessment of RED 2018, Hancer underlines that 
the ‘State aid regime will have an important role to play in ensuring that 
such support takes the form of “good aid”. But far more will be required 
of the Treaty toolbox in the Clean Energy Transition […]’.110
109 Article 3(5).
110 Hancer (n 49) 1.
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It is still too early to give a valid opinion on the effects of RED 2018 
without data to facilitate evidence-based criticism since this directive is 
to be transposed into national legislations by 2021. The fi ndings from 
the Renewable Energy Progress Report111 of April 2019 could be taken as 
a starting point. The report shows that the overall EU share of renewable 
energy in fi nal energy consumption by 2020 will be between 18.1% and 
20.7%. However, 11 Member States are considered likely to fail to meet 
their national targets by 2020. Seven Member States were considered to 
be well on the way to reaching national targets depending on their ability 
to reduce demand for energy. Nine Member States could reach national 
targets by 2020 if they engage in cooperation processes aiming at joint 
RES energy projects or support schemes. This is an area where RED 
2018 could help Member States support renewable energy by establish-
ing obligatory shares for cooperation in joint projects and joint support 
schemes.
Another report from IRENA112 in 2020 also shows careful optimism 
while warning of a widening gap between rhetoric and action.113 Accord-
ing to the fi ndings, ‘Renewable power generation is now growing faster 
than overall power demand […]’ but its share ‘[…] in global fi nal energy 
consumption has increased only slightly since 2010, staying around a 
threshold of about 10%’.114
In this respect, the EU fi gures115 show that the share of modern re-
newables in total energy supply was 15% in 2017 wh ile the planned ener-
gy scenario envisages 23% in 2030 and 33% in 20 50. The transformative 
energy scenario requires 71% by 2050. The share of modern renewables 
in total energy consumption in 2017 was 17% while the planned energy 
scenario envisages 24% in 2030 and 34% in 2050. The transformative 
energy scenario requires a 70% share of modern renewables in total en-
ergy consumption by 2050. The power generation share of modern re-
newables in 2017 was 31% while the planned energy scenario envisages 
44% in 2030 and 58% in 2050. The transformative energy scenario rais-
es the share of RES power generation to 86% by 2050.
111 Renewable Energy Progress Report COM (2019) 225 fi nal, according to Essig (n 106) 12.
112 IRENA  (2020) Global Renewables Outlook: Energy Transformation 2050 available at 
<www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Global-Renewables-Outlook-2020> accessed 2 
June 2020.
113 ‘The gap between aspiration and the reality in tackling climate change remains as sig-
nifi cant as ever, despite mounting evidence of the harm that climate change is causing’. 
IRENA (2020) (n 112) 19.
114 ibid, 22.
115 All fi gures from IRENA (2020) (n 112) 240-241.
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Under the planned energy scenario from 2016 to 2050, average an-
nual investments in renewable energy in the EU are estimated at USD 
38 billion, while the transformative energy scenario requires USD 78 
billion. Consequently, power grids and system fl exibility investments un-
der the planned energy scenario from 2016 to 2050 are estimated also 
at USD 38 billion annually, while the transformative energy scenario en-
visages USD 56 billion for the same purpose. However, according to the 
planned energy scenario, these ranges of investments will be suffi cient 
only if an additional USD 89 billion annually is invested in energy effi -
ciency in buildings, including integrated renewable energy, although the 
transformative energy scenario estimates that USD 130 billion annually 
will be needed for this purpose alone.
The fi gures presented are empirical support for identifi cation of 
the measurable targets that RED 2018 should assist Member States to 
achieve through all the available support measures. The reassessment 
of certain parts of RED 2018 in 2021, 2023, and 2025 would be valuable 
for timely adaptations of support measures and state aid rules in order 
to meet the Paris Agreement commitments. The most signifi cant change 
would be if the currently voluntary support measures were to become 
obligatory after an assessment of the target achievement by 2022. This 
would mean a policy decision on whether to continue to use a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach on a voluntary basis through sporadic Member States coop-
eration, or a ‘top-down’ scenario coordinated by the Commission. Both 
solutions could have political consequences for the EU as well as for 
the further development of state aid legislation envisaged after the end 
of the ‘fi tness check’ in 2022. Hancer’s criticism of the Member States’ 
inability to agree on alternative measures while suggesting a ‘state aid 
regime’ as the solution could be understood as his support for a ‘top-
down’ approach that is necessary in the circumstances.116 It seems that 
the presented fi gures, the IPCC fi ndings and a part of academic criticism 
suggest that a global issue such as climate change mitigation dictates a 
‘top-down’ approach due to technological and fi nancial constraints.
7.3 Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020
In principle, the Environment and Energy Guidelines (EEAG) elabo-
rate, in detail, the assessment criteria based on the GBER 2014 and RED 
116 ‘Given the failure to date of Member States to agree on alternative measures, the Treaty 
State aid regime may once again be called on to play the knight in shining armour in the 
increasingly urgent fi ght for climate change and in the realisation of the “Clean Energy 
Transition”. Ultimately, unfair taxation and clean energy transitions come down to the 
same political hot potato − a fundamental re-distribution of wealth’. In Hancer (n 49) 2.
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2009 provisions. First, the EEAG balance state aid against the ‘common 
interest’. In this respect, preventing state aid from distorting competition 
in the internal market and affecting trade between Member States is the 
main aim of the Guidelines. On the other hand, they call on the Energy 
2020 strategy and the ‘Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the 
Period from 2020 to 2030’, which aim to ensure security of supply of 
essential resources, fi ght against climate change and limit the environ-
mental impacts of the use of resources. In the delivery of this objective, 
the Commission suggests that Member States follow a cost-effective ap-
proach. Moreover, focus on the ex-ante scrutiny of cases with the ‘big-
gest impact on the internal market’ and the strengthening of cooperation 
with Member States in state aid enforcement is expected to contribute 
to climate change mitigation. The problem is that with regard to aid for 
energy from renewable resources, the cases with the ‘biggest impact on 
the internal market’ are also those that could matter the most in climate 
change mitigation. The outcome is that the trade-offs between different 
policies end at the expense of climate mitigation targets. In this con-
text, Marta Villar Ezcurra writes that ‘energy tax incentives are not al-
ways able to improve “environmental protection”’ because ‘some of them 
may be aimed at achieving other legitimate public policy objectives such 
as ensuring a competiti ve, sustainable and secure energy system in a 
well-functioning Union energy market’.117
Since the EEAG have been applied since 1 July 2014, the best way 
to present the outcome of the Guidelines used to support energy and 
the environment in the EU is to put them face to face with the latest 
available data showing whether or not the Member States are on track 
in four segments. The fi rst would be progress towards the 2020 climate 
and energy targets in regard to GHG emissions. The second should show 
the progress towards the 2020 climate and energy targets in regard to 
fi nal energy consumption. The third would aim to present the progress 
towards the 2020 climate and energy targets in regard to the share of 
renewables in gross fi nal energy consumption. The fourth and fi nal one 
would be to give a perspect ive on projected progress towards the 2030 
climate targets. The methodology and data for this counterfactual analy-
sis are taken from the European Environment Agency Report published 
in 2019.118 The report shows that concerning progress towards the 2020 
climate and energy targets in regard to GHG emissions, according to data 
117 Ezcurra Marta Villar, ‘The Concept of “Environmental Tax” in a State Aid Context When 
a Fiscal Energy Measure in Concerned’ (2017) 16 European State Aid Law Quarterly 1, 11.
118 European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe 2019: Tracking Prog-
ress Towards Europe’s Climate and Energy Targets’ EEA Report No 15/19, Luxembourg: 
Publication Offi ce of the European Union, 2019 available at <www.eea.europa.eu/publica-
tions/trends-and-projections-in-europe-1> accessed 1 June 2020.
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from 2017, ten Member States are not on track.119 In regard to progress 
towards the 2020 climate and energy targets related to fi nal energy con-
sumption, according to data from 2017, twelve Member States are not on 
track.120 Even worse, the report fi nds that, between 2014 and 2017, the 
consumption of energy from non-renewable sources increased.121 When it 
comes to progress towards the 2020 climate and energy targets in regard 
to the share of renewables in gross fi nal energy consumption according 
to 2017 fi gures,122 seven Member States are not on track.123 Therefore, 
the report raises concerns over the possibility that the EU might miss 
its 2020 targets.124 Projected progress towards the 2030 climate targets 
shows that, in 2019, only Sweden, Portugal, Greece and Malta were on 
track.125 Data show that in order to achieve this target, the average RES 
share has to increase by around  35% more per year compared to the 
current average annual increase of the RES share.126 Final ly, when the 
EU is considered as a ‘green leader’, it is important to bear in mind that 
the renewable electricity share is about 31% of the electricity consumed 
in the EU in 2017.127 One third of that total was generated by hydro-
power, another third by wind, and the fi nal third by all the other tech-
nologies.128 As state aid is a policy decision of the Member States, they 
119 ibid, 8, Figure ES.1.
120 ibid.
121 ‘Thus, the overall trend to reduce energy consumption shifted to the detriment of the 
RES share and of climate mitigation efforts: since 2015, in absolute terms, the consumption 
of fossil fuels has increased faster than the consumption of energy from renewable sources’. 
EEA (n 118) 42.
122 ibid, 8. Figure ES.1.
123 ‘A Member State is considered to be on track if its average 2017 share of energy from 
renewable sources matched or exceeded its 2017-2018 indicative trajectory under the RED. 
A Member State is considered to be not on track if its average 2017 share of energy from 
renewable sources was below its 2017-2018 indicative trajectory set under the RED’. EEA 
(n 118) 99.
124 ‘Preliminary estimates from the EEA indicate that the EU’s share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) also continued to increase in 2018, when it reached 18.0%. The EU therefore 
appears to be on track to meet its 20% target for renewable energy for 2020. However, in-
creases in fi nal energy consumption during recent years have negatively affected the annual 
increase in the share of renewable energy. Continuing at the current pace of renewable 
energy growth and fi nal energy consumption could put the EU at risk of slightly missing its 
20% target in 2020’. EEA (n 118) 40.
125  EEA (n 118) 10, Figure ES.3.
126 ‘To achieve this minimum level, the average RES share in the EU would need to increase 
by 1.1 percentage points per year from 2017 to 2030. This is more than the average increase 
of 0.7 percentage points per year that has been achieved since 2005’. EEA (n 118) 40.
127 ibid, 44.
128 ‘The most important RES are hydropower (35%), wind (34%), solar photovoltaic (12%) 
and solid biomass (9%) (Eurostat, 2019d) (EEA, 2018c). Roughly half of renewable elec-
tricity came from variable sources such as wind and solar power (Eurostat, 2019d), repre-
senting approximately 46% of all electricity generation. In 2018, the EEA’s approximated 
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are in a constant struggle to choose between supporting green energy 
for environmental reasons on the one hand, and other legitimate public 
policy objectives such as ensuring a sustainable and secure energy sys-
tem, on the other. As long ago as 2014, Zgajewski warned that without 
the careful application of the guidelines, due to RES intermittency ‘the 
current overcapacity of conventional power plants could become under-
capacity in the future’.129 The reluctance of the Member States to choose 
between environmental and energy priorities, combined with critiques 
against the inadequacy of the EEAG130 and overly strict state aid scruti-
ny,131 could be one of the reasons for the results presented in the above 
fi gures. This is certainly something that the ongoing state aid ‘fi tness 
check’ should take into consideration.
8 Conclusion
Analysis of the interaction between the EU climate change objec-
tives and state aid regulation in the area of renewable energy shows a 
strong link between the level of fulfi lment of climate and energy targets 
and competition policy in the energy market which to a certain extent 
is determined by technology, too. The chronology of the adoption of the 
EU’s key policy documents and related legislation describes the policy 
consistency of the EU’s climate change legislation, presenting the ‘nom-
inal’ nature of the EU’s credibility as a ‘green leader’ compared to other 
players. This understanding is due to the fact that the EU policies have 
not had the expected effect as determined by the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Paris Agreement. The gap between ambition and reality raises concerns 
considering the time pressure dictated by climate change predictions 
and the scale of technology development related to the increase of renew-
able energy capacity deployment and the necessary infrastructure as a 
precondition.  Such an increase in energy capacities and infrastructure 
to meet the 2050 targets, particularly for renewable electricity genera-
tion, requires enormous fi nancial resources from the EU and Member 
States. This, however, requires interventions in competition in energy 
markets and more specifi cally the state aid framework. This reconcilia-
tion of science, the market economy and energy politics has taken a great 
deal of effort by the EU institutions. A key legal challenge has been to 
estimates indicate that about 32% of total electricity consumed was derived from RES, with 
more than 48% of this share from wind (36%) and solar power (12%) (EEA (forthcoming), 
2019a)’. EEA (n 118) 44.
129 Tania Zgajewski, ‘Renewables: The Great Uncertainty of the EU Energy Strategy’ (Egmont 
Paper 71, Royal Institute for International Relations 2014) 27.
130 Ezcurra (n 117) 11.
131 Maillo (n 100) 6.
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coordinate national energy policies while respecting the TFEU ‘energy 
title’ and to open the way towards an EU Energy Policy. The Commis-
sion used the ‘energy packages’ to bring up climate change issues by 
dismantling monopolies in the energy sector and making it possible to 
support the introduction of renewable energy in the grid. This required 
state incentives that are contrary to the idea of competition in the com-
mon market, thus precipitating a fi nal challenge to improve the state 
aid framework to become more supportive to climate change mitigation, 
and whose upcoming changes should address the gap between ambi-
tion and reality.
The chronology of the adoption of the EU’s key policy documents 
and related legislation show that these challenges are addressed by the 
Commission through causality and in a systemic way in accordance with 
the available science. However, empirical data on state aid purposes, the 
range of renewable energy capacity deployment, shares in RES-based 
electricity generation and fi nal RES energy consumption prove the need 
for serious reconsideration of current state aid policy and law in the area 
of climate and energy policy. The fi rst warning is that achieving the 2020 
targets is increasingly uncertain. The second warning is that the rate of 
annual capacity additions to accelerate renewable power must expand 
signifi cantly to meet the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario share of 
half of generation by 2030. In this respect, the EU was in second place 
just after China until 2019. Concerning renewable electricity generation, 
the EU was in a slight lead over the North America region in 2018, but 
was generating half as much RES electricity than the Asia Pacifi c region. 
The State Aid Scoreboard 2018 shows that aid in the form of a reduction 
of environmental taxes represents 1/3 of aid provided under GBER for the 
period 2014-2017 which is 20 times more than the sum of support pro-
vided for investment and operating aid for RES promotion. Moreover, the 
Renewable Energy Progress Report of April 2019 shows that the overall 
EU share of renewable energy in fi nal energy consumption by 2020 will 
be between 18.1% and 20.7%. However, 11 Member States are consid-
ered likely to fail to meet their national targets by 2020. Seven Member 
States were considered to be on the right track to reach national targets 
depending on their ability to reduce demand for energy. Nine Member 
States could reach national targets by 2020 if they engage in cooperation 
processes aiming at joint RES energy projects or support schemes. This 
opens the way for RED 2018 to facilitate Member States through new 
initiatives to support renewable energy through cooperation in joint proj-
ects and joint support schemes. When the EU is considered a ‘green lead-
er’, it is important to bear in mind that the share of renewable electricity 
was about 31% of the electricity consumed in the EU in 2017, where one 
third of that total was generated by hydropower, another third by wind, 
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and the fi nal third by all other technologies. In 2019, ironically enough, 
China was found to be on course to meet its low-set Paris targets, while 
the US had the largest decline in energy-related CO2 emissions.
With all these fi gures in mind, an understanding of what being the 
‘green leader’ means could be diffi cult to agree on. The EU is consistent 
in its attempts to meet the Paris Agreement commitments. Until now, 
the EU has succeeded in meeting its own targets, albeit with numerous 
diffi culties. However, it could be argued that the EU has achieved these 
targets at the expense of its own economy, downscaling industry and 
manufacturing, while its growing services sector is still heavily depen-
dent on gas and oil imports for transport, heating and even electricity 
generation from gas plants that replaced the old coal power plants. The 
EU economy is based on common interest, ultimately represented by the 
internal market with undistorted competiti on. The question is whether 
it is time for the EU to reconsider its understanding of ‘common interest’ 
by putting more weight on climate change mitigation at the expense of 
certain elements of competition policy where compatible state aid could 
make a difference.  The implications of state aid for renewable energy 
generation are twofold. On one hand, too much support for renewable 
energy could create distortion of competition against conventional en-
ergy, but, more importantly, it could also create disbalance in favour of 
intermittent energy sources and problems in electricity supply. On the 
other hand, too strict state aid scrutiny could discourage crucial renew-
able energy projects necessary to meet the EU climate and energy goals 
if the focus of state aid is on protecting the competitiveness of intensive 
energy industries. Such a situation requires a balance between different 
legitimate aims where both state aid policy and law are at the centre of 
the discussion. Further research is therefore required on the impact of 
competition policy in general on renewable energy, since the focus of this 
paper is on the interaction between climate change objectives and state 
aid regulations through an assessment of GBER, RED and EEAG faced 
with relevant data resulting from EU activities in this respect. The im-
pact of the state aid regime, as a part of EU competition policy, is perhaps 
no greater on renewable energy than on other energy sectors, but it is 
more important because of the pressing circumstances in regard to cli-
mate change mitigation and the probable consequences which have been 
scientifi cally established by the IPCC. Consideration should be given to 
whether the ‘common interest’ of the EU is to ease state aid scrutiny over 
investment and operating state aid for renewable electricity generation in 
order to give investors security in the energy sector that is supposed to 
increase six-fold by 2050. The same kind of consideration should be giv-
en to energy effi ciency measures due to the fact that an energy-effi cient 
EU could save up to 30% of currently spent energy, thus reducing the 
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burden of rapidly increasing renewable electricity generation that cur-
rent technology can hardly cope with. Therefore, a future, more balanced 
state aid framework could be of key importance for the continuation of 
EU climate change mitigation efforts.
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